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I.

THE GENERAL RULE OF NONLIABILITY

This case involves policy concerns affecting small and large businesses in Idaho.
Pursuant to the laws of virtually every U.S. jurisdiction, a company that acquires the assets of
another generally does not assume the liabilities. See, WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, ET. AL, “Fletcher
Encyclopedia of Law of Private Corporations,” § 7122, (rev. vol. 2008); Ronald H. Rosenberg,
“The Ultimate Independence of the Federal Courts: Defying the Supreme Court in the Exercise
of Federal Common Law Powers,” 36 Conn. L. Rev. 425, 463 (2004) (“rule of non-liability for
asset acquisitions arose out of the bona fide purchaser rule, and was designed to promote the free
alienability of property and to enhance the efficiency of commercial transactions.”)
Thus, the general rule is nonliability. The policy rationales for the rule of nonliability are
straightforward. First, the nonliability rule appeals to fundamental notions of fairness: “[n]o
person should be bound by contractual obligations that they have not voluntarily assumed.
Similarly, no person should be liable for torts they did not commit.” Id., John H. Matheson,
Successor Liability, 96 MINN. L. REV. 371, 381 (2011). Second, a rule of nonliability increases
certainty in the marketplace and recognizes the importance of the free alienability of property. In
contrast, a broad rule of successor liability would have a “chilling effect on potential purchasers
who might acquire the assets of a foreclosed business and find themselves liable for debts they
never intended to assume.” Id.
The four limited exceptions to the rule of nonliability discussed in this case are designed
to alleviate, when appropriate, the same concern that “a company’s owners will use
manipulations of the corporate form to defraud creditors.” See Marie T. Reilly, “Making Sense
of Successor Liability,” 31 Hofstra L. Rev. 745, 769 (2003) (“the list of traditional factors for a
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finding of de facto merger or mere continuation describes a transfer and a transferee that have no
purpose but to defraud creditors.”)
The Idaho Legislature enacted Idaho’s Fraudulent Transfer Act which prohibits debtors
from making unlawful transfers to avoid paying its creditors. See, I.C. §§ 55-913-914. Thus,
creditors in Idaho have a remedy if they have been defrauded in an asset sale. No sound policy
reason exists to expand the rule of nonliability beyond the limited four successor liability
exceptions recognized in other states.
The district court’s opinion no doubt expands the implied assumption theory of successor
liability. Under the district court’s opinion, purchasing corporations would have to do very little
in order to be liable for debts it did not incur; did not agree to assume; and had no knowledge of.
This could have a chilling effect on business in Idaho. Moreover, under the district court’s
opinion, a purchaser with no notice or knowledge can be liable for an auto-renewal clause in a
contract it did not sign. Auto-renewal clauses, also referred to as “evergreen clauses” are
generally disfavored and their enforceability has been limited in many states. See Faegre Baker
Daniels LLP, “Automatic Renewal Laws in All 50 States”, (August 30, 2018); see, e.g.,
II.
A.

ARGUMENT

Whether Alsco Properly Plead A Claim For Relief Against Fatty’s LLC Is An
Issue Of Law Over Which This Court May Exercise Free Review.
Whether or not a claim has been properly plead in the complaint is an issue of law. Thus,

this Court may exercise free review of the court’s determination that Alsco properly plead a
claim for successor liability. Opportunity, L.L.C. Co. v. Western Heritage Ins. Co., 136 Idaho
602, 605, 38 P.3d 1258, 1261 (2002).
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Fatty’s LLC asserts Alsco waived its claim for successor liability against Fatty’s LLC as
a successor to Tons of Fun because Alsco failed to properly plead a successor liability claim
against Fatty’s LLC. Alsco’s first response is that the argument was raised for the first time in
Fatty’s LLC’s motion for reconsideration. (Respondent’s Opening Brief, p. 10.) Alsco,
however, did not argue or assert to the district court that Fatty’s LLC had somehow waived the
pleading issue because it was raised during the motion for reconsideration; and the district court
addressed the issue making it ripe for appeal. The reason the pleading issue was raised for the
first time in the motion for reconsideration is because Alsco had consistently avoided naming
Tons of Fun, LLC as the predecessor corporation, but and instead continually referred to “Clay
Roman d/b/a Fatty’s.” After the close of discovery and just before trial, Alsco alleged in its Trial
Brief that “Fatty’s LLC was a successor in interest to the entity that existed in 2011 when the
agreement was made.” Alsco Trial Brief, R. p. 67 (emphasis added). Thus, going into trial Alsco
did not name Tons of Fun, LLC as the predecessor company. Nor did Alsco ever claim it was an
issue of fact for the district court to decide.
Alsco carried the burden of proof on its claim of successor liability and it is hard to
conclude Alsco met its burden when it was not certain who the alleged predecessor company was
during trial (or after trial). Even in its proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed
after trial, Alsco avoids naming who or what Fatty’s LLC’s is a successor to; and instead states
as a proposed conclusion: “the evidence clearly identified Fatty’s Bar LLC as a successor in
interest.” Alsco FFCL, R. p. 83. Thus, Alsco skated the issue throughout this case and failed to
even make a motion to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence as allowed for under
I.R.C.P. 15(b)(2).
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Alsco next argues that Fatty’s
is

LLC

asking this Court t0 re-weigh the evidence, which

is

not the case. (Respondent’s Opening Brief, p. 11.) Fatty’s

determine,

by

LLC

is

asking this Court t0

a review of the pleadings and other court ﬁlings, that Alsco simply failed t0 plead

LLC

a claim for successor liability against Fatty’s

as a successor in interest t0

Tons 0f Fun LLC.1

Alsco carried the burden 0f pleading and proving the identity of the alleged predecessor
corporation in order t0 sustain a successor liability claim. This Court

issue

and should hold

that the trial court erred

when made

this

may freely review this

determination absent any

pleadings 0r deﬁnitive argument presented by Alsco.

Alsco Presented

B.

N0 Evidence Showing Fatty’s LLC Purchased All

Substantially All 0f Tons 0f Fun

LLC’s

0r

Assets.

In response t0 Appellants argument that

n0 evidence was presented

Fatty’s

LLC

0f the assets 0f Tons 0f Fun LLC, Respondent

merely

re-cites the trial court’s opinion

purchased

all

Alsco claims the

0r substantially

district

substantially 0f the assets 0f

assumed the

all

and mis-states the

court

correctly

Tons 0f Fun,

assets 0f Fatty’s, a d/b/a for

by Alsco

LLC

“Fatty’s Bar,

acquired

all

Tons of Fun, LLC, including but not limited

t0 the

all

marketing and/or business related assets.” (Respondent’s Opening Brief,

is

The

district court states in its

liquor license, refrigerator and bar

p. 12).

Findings 0f Fact and Conclusions 0f

were not

assets

Regardless of this mis-statement, Alsco

owned by Tons 0f Fun, LLC.”

fails to

demonstrate

0r

LLC, purchased and/or

business name, the lease 0f the space occupied by Fatty’s, the liquor license, and

not true.

that

facts.

concluded Fatty’s

LLC when

at trial

how

This

Law

other

simply

that “[t]he

R. p. 145.

the district court could

l

LLC presented evidence in its Opening Brief that Alsco knew prior to the time the lawsuit was ﬁled that
LLC was the owner 0f the business called Fatty’s When the Alsco Contract was signed merely to
demonstrate that Alsco had knowledge to assert that Fatty’s LLC became a successor to Tons 0f Fun LLC, yet failed
Fatty’s

Tons 0f Fun
t0

do

so.

Appellant’s Opening Brief, pp. 16-17.
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correctly conclude Fatty’s

Fun LLC.

In order t0

LLC

purchased

know Whether

all

0r not a

another companies’ assets, there must be

owned by the
presented at

selling corporation.

company has purchased

0r substantially

some evidence presented showing

This record

LLC

is

all

0f

the total assets

devoid 0f any such evidence because

it

was not

has disregarded the evidence 0f the Fatty’s Bar Agreement.

(Respondent’s Opening Brief, pp. 12-13).

with the Masonheimer’s testimony)

LLC

is

from Tons 0f Fun, LLC.

T0

the contrary, the Fatty’s

the best evidence 0f

The

W.

state that Fatty’s

Bar

LLC

is

purchasing

all

Bar Agreement (along

what was allegedly purchased by

Bar Agreement

Fatty’s

“purchasing the physical equipment located at 800

does not

all

owned by Tons of

trial.

Alsco asserts Fatty’s

Fatty’s

0r substantially all 0f the assets

Idaho.” Tr. EX.

states that Fatty’s

8.

LLC

is

This agreement simply

0f Tons 0f Fun, LLC’S assets (which would

be contrary t0 the undisputed evidence).

The uncontradicted evidence
of Fun
Justin

LLC

eight

Zora and

that Fatty’s

Fatty’s,

LLC was

reversible error

C.

months

at trial

after Fatty’s,

LLC. N0

was

LLC

Fatty’s

opened

LLC

for business because 0f a dispute

other evidence exists.

a successor t0 Tons 0f

Fun

is

purchased some assets from Tons

The

between

district court’s decision, therefore,

not supported by the record and constitutes

and an abuse of discretion.

Fatty’s,

LLC

is

Not Asking the Court

t0

Reweigh the Evidence 0n Implied

Assumption.
Respondent mistakenly argues Fatty’s
and testimony from the

trial

2

is

asking this Court t0 re-weigh the evidence

regarding the issue 0f implied assumption.

signiﬁcant amount of time re-hashing what
this issue.2

LLC

it

Respondent devotes a

perceives t0 be the relevant evidence surrounding

(Respondent’s Opening Brief, pp. 14-15.)

This evidence consists entirely 0f conversations and actions between Alsco and Fatty’s LLC.
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Fatty’s LLC is not asking this Court to re-weigh the evidence. Fatty’s LLC is asking this
Court to recognize and hold that the district court misapplied the law surrounding implied
assumption. Specifically, the district court incorrectly focused on the actions and relationship
between Fatty’s LLC and Alsco when it determined there was an implied assumption of the
Alsco contract by Fatty’s LLC. The correct analysis should have been a consideration of the
relationship between Fatty’s LLC and Tons of Fun LLC.
In MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 40 Misc.3d 643, 675 (New York,
2013), the court reviewed the implied assumption theory of successor liability, stating “the
implied assumption theory—and the successor liability doctrine generally—do not focus on the
conduct of the third-party bringing the successor liability claim. The focus instead is on the
relationship between asset buyer and seller and the buyer’s post-acquisition conduct with respect
to the assets. An examination of the third-party claimant’s reliance on the acts of the asset buyer
is immaterial to this analysis.” Id. The only evidence presented by Alsco at trial and relied upon
by the district court with respect to Fatty’s LLC’s post-acquisition conduct is that Fatty’s LLC
accepted weekly deliveries form Alsco and paid for the deliveries; requested to be invoiced for
the services and pay monthly instead of paying cash for each delivery; and notified Alsco of a
change of address. R. p. 145. These facts (all of which Fatty’s, LLC concedes are true for
purposes of this appeal), when applied to basic successor liability law, cannot support a
conclusion of implied assumption to assume an entire contractual liability with a five-year autorenewal clause. At best, Fatty’s, LLC agreed to receive and pay for weekly linen service
deliveries at an amount and price that continually changed based on Fatty’s LLC’s needs. There
was no evidence that Fatty’s, LLC received a benefit from Alsco, such as a reduced price.
Instead, Fatty’s LLC changed vendors because it could obtain linens elsewhere at a much lower
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price. Alsco, instead, received the benefit of Fatty’s LLC’s business for years after it opened.
Indeed, Fatty’s LLC used more of Alsco’s linen services than did Tons of Fun – all of which
Fatty’s LLC paid for. The Alsco Contract did not contain any benefits for Fatty’s LLC – only
obligations.

Moreover, as stated in the Countrywide opinion, Fatty’s LLC must have

demonstrated an intent to be obligated “with respect to the asset.” Id. No asset is involved here.
Instead, the Alsco Contract was a services contract and not any sort of asset or payment
agreement.
Alsco presented no evidence that any representative of Fatty’s LLC made any statements
or demonstrated any conduct towards Tons of Fun LLC, or Alsco, that would indicate Fatty’s
LLC intended to assume or be liable for the obligations under the Alsco contract. As such, this
Court should conclude the law of successor liability was mis-applied.
D.

The Auto-Renewal Clause Should Not Apply to Fatty’s LLC.
If this Court determines Fatty’s LLC impliedly assumed the service contract between

Tons of Fun LLC and Alsco, this Court should hold that the auto-renewal clause was not a debt
that could be passed to Fatty’s LLC.
The trial court and Respondent cite Bird Hill Farms, Inc. v. U.S. Cargo & Courier Serv.,
Inc., for the assertion that, for purposes of successor liability, “liabilities” include not only
outstanding debt, but also contingent future liability on a contract. Id., 845 A.2d 900, 906 (Pa.
Super. 2004) R. 146-147. (Respondent’s Opening Brief, p. 16.) This opinion, however, does not
support a finding of liability for a contingent future liability for an auto-renewal clause. The
Bird Hill Farms case involved assumption of the rent obligations contained in a lease of real
property. Id. The purchasing corporation in Bird Hill Farms had complete knowledge of the
lease at issue and the terms of the lease – and an assumption of the lease was discussed between
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the two companies and mentioned in the purchase and sale agreement. Id. The purchasing
corporation was then found to be liable for the selling corporation’s lease payments under an
implied assumption theory because 1) it occupied the entire leased premises for eleven months;
2) it paid the rent and all the utilities in its own name; and 3) it maintained the property and
installed fire extinguishers.

Id.

The court concluded that, under these circumstances, the

purchasing corporation was liable for all remaining rent payments under the lease after it vacated
the premises. Id.
This is in sharp contrast to Fatty’s LLC’s actions of ordering weekly linens to fit its own
business needs and paying Alsco for them. It is undisputed Fatty’s LLC did not ever see the
Alsco Contract until well after the fact. Moreover, the Bird Hill Farms court points out: “our
review of the case law has not identified an authoritative case addressing an implicit assumption,
and other jurisdictions confronting this issue have reached different results.” Id., 845 A.2d at
905 (citations omitted).
E.

Alsco Has Not Provided A Basis to Disregard the Statute of Frauds.
A review of the general law of successor liability as applied by other jurisdictions reveals

that no court has stated that the statute of frauds is inapplicable when successor liability is found
based upon the theory of implied assumption of contract. Alsco continues to argue that Lehman
Bros. Holdings, Inc. v. Gateway Funding Diversified Mtg. Servs., L.P. stands for the proposition
that the statute of frauds does not apply to this case. Yet there is an important and obvious
distinction that it overlooks. In Lehman Bros., the court found successor liability based upon the
de facto merger theory of successor liability (as opposed to implied assumption). Id., 942
F.2upp.2d 516, 523 (E.D. Pa 2013). To be liable under the de facto merger theory, a continuity
of ownership must exist between selling and purchasing corporation. Id. In Lehman Bros, the
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court found issues of fact precluded summary judgment regarding continuity of ownership
between the selling and purchasing corporation, and refused to find successor liability under de
facto merger as a matter of law. Id. The court then addressed the statute of frauds argument
presented by the purchasing corporation, and denied summary judgment again stating: “If the
jury finds the existence of a de facto merger, then by definition gateway assumes Arlington’s
written liabilities.” Id., 942 F.Supp. 2d at 533 (emphasis added).
Under the de facto merger theory of successor liability, which is not at issue here, the
purchasing corporation consists of the same owners who already signed a written agreement on
behalf of the selling corporation that satisfied the statute of frauds. No owner or representative
of Fatty’s, LLC signed the Alsco Contract. There is no authority to support a conclusion that the
statute of frauds should be disregarded every time successor liability is found to exist. Thus, the
statute of frauds must be applied here -- before a non-signing party can be held liable for a
perpetual contract. The statute of frauds was no doubt enacted to ensure there is a firm record of
what was agreed to by the parties when the deal was struck, thereby providing parties with the
opportunity to review the terms and conditions of an important deal before making the contract
final.
Finally, Idaho’s statute frauds is narrowly construed. Frantz v Parke, 111 Idaho 1005,
1007, 729 P.2d 1068, 070 (Ct. App. 1986). Section 9-505 clearly states that an agreement that
cannot be performed within a year from the making is unenforceable unless “signed by the party
to be charged.” Id. Here, Fatty’s, LLC did not sign the Alsco Contract and therefore Fatty’s,
LLC cannot be liable for the provisions of the Alsco Contract that cannot be performed within
one-year.
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CONCLUSION

III.

Fatty’s,

that

LLC

Alsco failed

Fatty’s,

LLC

LLC would

t0

respectfully requests this Court reverse the district court’s opinion and

prove Fatty’s,

LLC

is

a successor in interest t0 Tons 0f Fun,

cannot be liable t0 Alsco under a theory 0f successor

liability.

be deemed the prevailing party and the award of damages

As

LLC; and

set aside

and the case

2019.

PARE

By

& COZAKOS, PLLC
/s/ Shelly

H. Cozakos

Shelly H. Cozakos,

that

a result, Fatty’s,

remanded accordingly.

DATED: August 9,

ﬁnd

Of the Firm

Attorneysfor Defendant-CounterclaimantAppellant
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